

Improved: Symlinks are followed inside the Boxcryptor drive if they target another location.Improved: Compatibility with various backup solutions.Removed: Support for Spotlight (see note below).Added: Auto-detection for MagentaCLOUD, CloudMe, SpiderOak, Storegate and Yandex.Added: Support for Google Drive shortcuts.This version has official support for macOS Big Sur (11.0). Fixed: Multiple mirrored Google Drive accounts are not correctly auto-detected.Fixed: Microsoft Teams private channels are not correctly auto-detected.Changed: Removed path length restriction for Microsoft Excel.
Macfuse on iphone pdf#
Macfuse on iphone for mac#


Macfuse on iphone code#
Added: Device code two-factor authentication.Fixed: Opening online-only files in OneDrive and Box fails on the first attempt.Added: Mitigation for Dropbox on macOS 12.3.If you are already signed in with your Boxcryptor account on a device, you are always able to access your encrypted files regardless of your internet connection or availability of our servers.Īll new Boxcryptor for macOS. As outlined in our Technical Overview (chapter Why and when Boxcryptor requires an internet connection ), only the following actions require an active connection to our servers: Boxcryptor has been designed in such a manner, that access to our servers is not required for the regular usage of our client software. We do our best to provide a high availability of our service, but during these two hours access to our servers might be degraded and/or even unavailable. Tasks which might have an impact on the availability of our service will be conducted in weekly maintenance windows at the following time:Įvery Monday, 00:00 - 02:00 UTC+1 (4pm - 6pm UTC-7) I would trust that too from a security perspective though not necessarily as much from a stability perspective, though it’s mostly fine if you only intend on reading files not writing.In order to constantly improve our service and to keep our servers up-to-date, we regularly maintain our infrastructure. I would assume that the programs you list, trevorit and cryptomator use already existing FUSE packages though, like ext4fuse or whatever the package is called. Whether file system support layers on top of it are trustworthy is a case by case basis, but as a result of the FUSE model, if they are not, their harm is at the very least limited to the file system they add support for (unless they find a way to exploit the macFUSE kext itself). Anything that runs in kernel space can bring down the whole system if it’s buggy or potentially allow arbitrary code execution with kernel privileges if exploitable.īut again, I do trust macFUSE itself. MacFUSE itself is also a kernel extension and while I trust macFUSE itself, a kernel extension will increase the attack surface and the system crash likelihood - that’s basically inevitable. A file system support package would still be able to snoop on the files it is responsible for, but it wouldn’t be able to snoop on files from other file systems. MacFUSE itself is still open source, and the principle behind FUSE is to have file system support in user space which improves security in the sense that the file system support won’t have kernel access.
